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1673 
DEBUNKING “DE MINIMIS” VIOLATIONS OF PRISONERS’ 
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS: FURTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE SUPREME 




Circuits are split as there continues to be an inconsistent 
application of Supreme Court doctrine stemming from the notion of 
the separation of church and the state.  Imprisonment does not strip a 
wrongdoer of his constitutionally guaranteed rights and protections. 
Some Circuits have held that a minor, or de minimis, interpretation of 
an inmate’s religious rights can constitute a substantial burden under 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.  In the 
absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court, I propose that 
courts should refrain from determining the value of a religious belief 
or practice as it relates to a religious adherent and err on the side of 
providing religious accommodations whenever reasonable.  This 
would follow the intended goal of the religious-question doctrine and 
protect constitutionally guaranteed rights as well as likely benefit the 
society and the individual wrongdoer in his efforts towards 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Man's relation to his God was made no concern of the 
state. He was granted the right to worship as he 
pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his 
religious views. The religious views espoused by 
respondents might seem incredible, if not 
preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines 
are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding 
their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with 
the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact 
undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain. 
The First Amendment does not select any one group or 
any one type of religion for preferred treatment.1 
Imprisonment does not strip an individual wrongdoer of his 
constitutionally guaranteed rights and protections.2  The religion 
clauses of the First Amendment center on a controversial topic of 
discussion- religious practices and beliefs within correctional 
institutions.3  The Constitutional framers’ uncontroversial objectives 
of the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses were “both to prevent the 
establishment of a national religion by the new federal government 
and to protect the right of individuals to freely exercise their religious 
beliefs.”4  A notable issue that arises when analyzing the Religion 
Clause is that the Supreme Court has not provided a specific 
definition of “religion.”5  Another crucial issue is the inconsistent 
application of Supreme Court doctrine stemming from the notion of 
the separation of church and the state.6  This Note will argue that 
 
1 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
2 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987), superseded by statute, Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 
(2000) (“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the 
protections of the Constitution.”). 
3 Provision of Religious Facilities for Prisoners, 12 A.L.R.3d 1276 § 2. 
4 Jeffrey L. Oldham, Constitutional “Religion” A Survey of First Amendment 
Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 118 (2001). 
5 Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion Under 
the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of 
Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 
N.D.L. REV. 123, 126 (2007). 
6 Christopher C. Lund, Rethinking the "Religious-Question" Doctrine, 41 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1013, 1014 (2014). 
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until the Supreme Court clarifies the proper analysis for religious 
exercise claims for the lower courts, the religious freedom of inmates 
should be protected and their needs reasonably accommodated.  
Kenneth Colvin, Jr., an inmate, brought claims against prison 
officials, claiming they violated his constitutional rights as a Jewish 
prisoner.7  Upon transfer from one state prison to another, he was 
mistakenly denied service in accordance with a kosher-meal program 
on numerous occasions.8  Prison officials erred in believing he was 
instead a Muslim, and denied him kosher-meal status for a total of 
sixteen days.9  Further, Colvin was served non-kosher food on 
multiple occasions even when he finally obtained the formal dietary 
status.10  Not only did the prison officials see no wrong in their 
failure to assist in helping Colvin practice his religion, the trial court 
dismissed certain claims “because any errors in the preparation of 
[his] kosher meals were inadvertent and isolated.”11  Contrary to the 
value that a religious adherent places on his maintenance of a strict 
kosher diet, the Sixth Circuit noted that the actions of the prison 
officials “at worst, [constituted] a reasonable mistake” as to Colvin’s 
status.”12  This is just one example of how a lack of uniformity in the 
analysis of religious exercise cases leads to prison officials violating 
prisoners’ constitutional rights. 
This Note will focus on the courts’ inconsistencies when 
analyzing religious accommodations and will highlight the need for 
clearer principles and applications.  It will address the circuit split on 
the issue of whether a minor, or de minimis, interruption of a 
prisoner’s religious rights can constitute a substantial burden as 
outlined under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (“RLUIPA”).13  The Note will explain how the Supreme Court 
expanded its rule prohibiting courts from delving into religious 
questions.14  Additionally, it will provide examples of how courts fail 
 
7 Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 2010). 
8 Id.  
9 Id. 
10 Id.  
11 Id. at 288. 
12 Id. at 291. 
13 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5. 
14 See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87 (“But if those [religious] doctrines are subject to trial 
before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done 
with the religious beliefs of any sect.  When the triers of fact undertake that risk, 
they enter a forbidden domain.”). 
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to refrain from interfering with religious questions.  Lastly, the Note 
will highlight the importance of clarification within the judicial 
system with respect to religious questions.   
This Note will be divided into six sections.  Sections II and III 
will introduce the doctrine at the forefront of the religious 
accommodation claims and statutes pertaining to free religion claims.  
The Supreme Court’s religious-question doctrine holds that the courts 
should refrain from taking positions on religious issues and has an 
extensive history.15  This doctrine emerged to support the country’s 
system of separation between church and state.16 
Section IV will demonstrate the judicial history of religious 
exercise claims and will examine the circuit split, how different 
courts interpret religious exercise claims, and how they weigh the 
religious adherent’s practices objectively.  Lower courts are without 
clear direction from the Supreme Court and thus inconsistently apply 
the religious-question doctrine.17  For instance, some circuit courts 
have answered religious questions using the term de minimis in 
denying a religious prisoner’s First Amendment claim.18  The Second 
and Seventh Circuits have determined that a de minimis violation of 
an inmate’s free religious exercise rights may substantially burden his 
beliefs.19  To the contrary, the Tenth Circuit has held that de minimis 
inadvertent mishaps that clash with a prisoner’s religious rights do 
not rise to a substantial burden.20 
Section V will demonstrate the conflicting issues in the 
balance of providing religious accommodations and penological 
concerns.  The primary reason that courts have denied religious 
 
15 Lund, supra note 6, at 1014. 
16 Id. at 1013. 
17 Bernie Pazanowski, Muslim Inmate’s Free Exercise Suit Over Being Served Pork 
Tossed, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 24, 2020, 3:16 PM), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/white-collar-and-criminal-
law/XC3D1FDO 000000?bna_news_filter=white-collar-and-criminal-law. There is 
a circuit split on an issue of free exercise rights. Id. The Third, Sixth, and Tenth 
Circuits held that minor violations of an inmate’s religious rights do not 
substantially burden his beliefs. Id.  The Second and Seventh Circuits held that 
such minor violations may substantially burden an inmate’s religious beliefs.  Id. 
18 See McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (“There may 
be inconveniences so trivial that they are most properly ignored.  In this respect, 
this area of the law is no different from many others in which the time-honored 
maxim ‘de minimis non curat lex’ applies.”). 
19 See generally Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582 (2d. Cir. 2003). 
20 See generally Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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accommodation requests are safety and prison security concerns.21  
Section V will then discuss the benefits of providing justifiable 
religious accommodations whenever possible in accordance with an 
individual’s First Amendment religious rights.  Strong evidence has 
established that religious practice within prison systems helps 
promote rehabilitation and decrease recidivism rates.22  “[T]he 
percentage of prisoners professing minority faiths tends to be larger 
than the proportion of those faiths among non-incarcerated adults in 
the United States 18 years and older.”23  Given these demographics, it 
is crucial that all religious adherents are provided with the reasonably 
necessary means to maintain their practices so that they have the 
support and organization to encourage them to maintain a law-
abiding lifestyle following their release.  Notably, prisoners adhering 
to minority religions are among those who file the largest number of 
free religious exercise claims.24   
Lastly, Section VI will conclude the Note by proposing that in 
the absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court, the courts 
should protect constitutional rights whenever reasonable and 
justifiable given the potential positive force of religion in prisons and 
the possibility to provide the necessary additional protections to 
religious minorities.  Whether a minor de minimis intrusion or, as 
some courts may label it, a more substantial infringement with a 
religious right, courts should consider the impacts of any government 
action and encourage religious accommodations to the fullest extent 
practicable.  A court that analyzes de minimis language should follow 
the Second and Seventh Circuits by finding that any de minimis 
violation of a prisoner’s religious rights could substantially burden 
his beliefs.25 
 
21 UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., ENFORCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 
PRISON, 1, 91 (Sept. 2008), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=231715 (providing 
a table that portrays the types of RLUIPA cases and reasons for their denials 
annually). 
22 Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and 
Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
501, 511 (2005). 
23 UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 39. 
24 Id. at 102. 
25 See infra Section II. 
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II. THE FOREFRONT OF THE CONFUSION AMONG LOWER 
COURTS 
Inmates are faced with many restrictions on their liberty as a 
consequence of their illegal actions.  These people, however, under 
the First Amendment, maintain their right to free religious exercise 
while imprisoned.26  As correctional facility populations overflow, so 
do the conflicts within these systems in regard to accommodating 
prisoners’ religious beliefs.27  While prisons have policies in place to 
guide religious practices, there have been continuous complaints 
from prisoners arguing that the correctional staff members have 
violated their constitutional religious rights.28  The circuit courts are 
split on the issue of whether a de minimis29 interruption of an 
inmate’s religious rights substantially burdens his beliefs.   
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”30  Under the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”)31: 
[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use 
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial 
burden on the religious exercise of a person, including 
a religious assembly or institution, unless the 
government demonstrates that imposition of the 
burden on that person, assembly, or institution—(A) is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.32 
 
26 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). 
27 UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 78; see also 
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Ben-Levi v. Brown, 136 S. Ct. 930 (2016). 
28 See generally Enforcing Religious Freedom in Prison, supra note 21 (The United 
States Commission on Civil Rights must transmit this report pursuant to Public 
Law § 103-419.  It analyzes governmental attempts to enforce federal civil rights 
law precluding religious discrimination within the structure of federal and state 
prisons.  The findings from the data collected showed that there has been a steady 
increase in the reported RLUIPA cases annually.). 
29 (Of a fact or thing) so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an 
issue or case. De minimis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
31 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5. 
32 Id. 
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However, inmates’ religious rights  are limited due to the weight of 
the penological interests33 that the courts must consider when 
determining whether requested religious practices can be 
accommodated.34  When a plaintiff meets the threshold of 
demonstrating a prison’s substantial burden on his religious rights, 
the responsibility then shifts to the defendant government to show 
that the substantial burden is the result of a “compelling government 
interest,”35 and that the government has invoked the “least restrictive 
means”36 of accomplishing its penological objectives.37 
 
33 UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 3 (“The Court has 
recognized that deterrence, rehabilitation, and institutional security are all valid 
penological objectives that may result in limitations on prisoners’ rights.”); see also 
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). 
34 Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002). 
35 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Statement of the Department of Justice on the 
Institutionalized Persons Provisions of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA), https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/974661/download.  A 
“compelling governmental interest” is one that furthers “good order, security and 
discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Id. at 4.  
For example, “requiring grooming in segregated holding has been found to further 
the compelling interest of health and security and placing certain restrictions on the 
formation of organized groups has been found to serve the limited interest of 
preventing the growth of gangs.”  Id. at 5.  A compelling governmental interest has 
not been found in the administration of a prison’s dietary system when the 
correctional facility already serves meals that would satisfy the prisoner’s dietary 
needs, as well as in instances where the government placed an arbitrary limit on the 
quantity of books an inmate could store in his prison cell.  Id. 
36 Id. at 5. (“To satisfy the ‘least restrictive means’ requirement of RLUIPA, courts 
have required institutions to show that alternative means of satisfying the 
compelling government interest were considered and found insufficient.  The 
ability of other correctional institutions to further comparable interests without 
using the challenged regulations is evidence that a less restrictive alternative is 
available.  Indeed, where a significant number of other institutions allow an 
accommodation, an institution cannot deny that accommodation consistent with 
RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny requirement unless the institution offers persuasive 
reasons why it cannot adopt the less restrictive methods used elsewhere.  Less 
restrictive alternatives used by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) are particularly 
relevant to the least restrictive means analysis because BOP manages the country’s 
largest correctional system while adhering to the comparably strict protections for 
religious exercise that are guaranteed by RFRA.  Consequently, where BOP 
accommodates a particular religious exercise, an institution that forbids that 
exercise is unlikely to satisfy RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny inquiry unless it can 
demonstrate that the BOP approach is unworkable.”). 
37 Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir. 2010). 
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Since the Supreme Court has consistently determined that the 
judicial system should keep its “hands off” religious questions, the 
Court should then, under a strict application of the religious-question 
doctrine, and in the interests of the First Amendment’s Religion 
Clauses, rule in favor of the Second and Seventh Circuits by 
determining that a de minimis violation of a prisoner’s religious rights 
may substantially burden his beliefs.38  Federal courts have “no 
business addressing” whether religious beliefs alleged in relation to 
free exercise claims are reasonable.39  “It cannot be gainsaid that the 
judiciary is singularly ill-equipped to sit in judgment on the verity of 
an adherent’s religious beliefs.”40  Since the subjective beliefs of the 
religious adherents are crucial and unique, courts cannot precisely 
clarify the value of a person’s specific beliefs and practices; thus, the 
judicial system cannot sufficiently determine whether a religious 
burden is de minimis.  Therefore, given the Supreme Court’s lack of 
guidance in relation to the proper application of the religious-
question-doctrine to free religious exercise claims, lower courts are 
left uncertain as to whether violations of specific religious 
accommodations impede an individual’s constitutionally protected 
rights. 
III.  THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION DOCTRINE: DID THE SUPREME 
COURT LEAVE THE LOWER COURTS TO INTERPRET THE 
DOCTRINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR OWN OBJECTIVE 
BELIEFS? 
The idea that courts should refrain from taking positions on 
religious questions has a long history.41  The purpose of this notion 
emerged from our nation’s system, supported by the Constitution, 
 
38 Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) “Thus, the departure-from-doctrine element of 
the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the 
very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the 
importance of those doctrines to religion.  Plainly, the First Amendment forbids 
civil courts from playing such a role.”  Id. at 450. 
39 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724 (2014) (The religious 
claims here were that the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandates 
substantially burdened their free religious exercise constitutional rights). 
40 Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). 
41 Lund, supra note 6, at 1014. 
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that separates the operations of church and state.42  While simple at 
first glance, the hands-off doctrine becomes complicated when a 
court must determine a religious accommodation claim.  The 
complexity arises because a court must analyze the religious 
accommodation claim before deciding on the issue.  The application 
of the “hands off” religious questions principle becomes complex as 
courts must often analyze a religious accommodation claim to 
determine if it may even adjudicate the claim in the first place.43  In 
1871, the Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones44 established that judges 
cannot decide “the true standard of good faith in the church 
organization.”45 
In 1944, the Supreme Court in United States v. Ballard46 
provided that while a religious claim raised may seem “incredible” to 
some individuals, fact finders must not enter the “forbidden domain” 
of determining its “truth or falsity.”47  Then, in 1969, the Court in 
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Church48 determined that the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
direct courts to rule on disputes while refraining from resolving 
 
42 Id. at 1013. 
43 The hands-off doctrine has been coined by legal scholars and commentators to 
refer to the notion that courts must refrain from deciding religious questions.  See 
Samuel J. Levine, The Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Religious 
Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 793, 795 (2009) (“[T]here is 
ample Supreme Court case law supporting the proposition that the Court generally 
eschews decision making that requires adjudication of religious doctrine.”); Nathan 
S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1198 
(2017) (“Courts refer to the prohibition on deciding disputes about religious truth 
as the ‘religious question doctrine.’  Scholars variously call it the ‘no religious 
decision’ principle of the ‘hands-off approach’ to religious questions.”); William 
Bennett Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' 
Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473, 473 (1971) (“For most of our history, the 
complaints of prisoners about conditions of life in prison were ignored by the 
courts.  Judicial review was avoided under the ‘hands-off’ doctrine.”); Kent 
Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious 
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) (“Government must keep out of 
internal problems of religious bodies when those problems concern religious 
understandings.”). 
44 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
45 Id. at 727. 
46 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
47 Id. at 87. 
48 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
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religious doctrine issues.49  The Supreme Court held in Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich50 that courts shall not 
contradict the religious interpretations of religious tribunals, and 
expanded on this ruling in Thomas v. Review Board Indiana 
Employment Security Division,51 by determining that it should not 
contradict any religious authority.52  In reaching its conclusion, the 
Court determined that it was “ill equipped” to resolve a religious 
doctrine question.53  The Thomas Court reasoned that: 
it was not for [the courts] to say that the line he drew 
was an unreasonable one.  Courts should not 
undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the 
believer admits that he is ‘struggling’ with his position 
or because his beliefs are not articulated with clarity 
and precision that a more sophisticated person might 
employ.54 
A substantial issue is that courts do in fact enter into the realm of 
religious questions, in contradiction to Supreme Court precedent, to 
adjudicate free exercise claims and prevent the flooding of the 
courts.55  In order to protect both governmental institutions and 
prisoners, there are three threshold inquiries that a claimant must pass 
through in religious free exercise claims: (1) the claim must be based 
on religious grounds, (2) the claimant must show that the lack of the 
request sought would substantially burden her religious exercise, and 
(3) she must demonstrate that she is sincere in her religious beliefs.56  
The “hands-off” doctrine flows from the principle that secular courts 
 
49 Id. at 449. 
50 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
51 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
52 Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to 
Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 93 (1997). 
53 Thomas, 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). 
54 Id.  
55 Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We 
Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837 (2009) (“But the fact that judges 
charged with deciding legal questions are usually unfamiliar with religious texts, 
doctrines, and traditions would not seem to require, as a principled matter, a strong 
hands-off rule.  Judges answer hard questions, untangle complicated problems, and 
educate themselves about new fields, all the time.  They hear testimony; they listen 
to experts; they consider arguments.”). 
56 Adeel Mohammadi, Sincerity, Religious Questions, and the Accommodation 
Claims of Muslim Prisoners, 129 YALE L.J. 1836, 1848 (2020). 
10
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cannot resolve “metaphysical or theological issues.”57  While the 
Court has yet to specifically define “religion,” it rarely challenges 
“members of well-recognized traditions.”58  The claimant holds the 
burden of establishing that her claims are grounded in religion, rather 
than “purely philosophical, ethical, or other nonreligious grounds.”59   
The Supreme Court, however, has yet to explicitly define and 
demonstrate the difference between religious and nonreligious 
claims.60  In Wisconsin v. Yoder,61 the Supreme Court noted that 
determining which requested accommodation is a constitutionally 
protected “religious” belief or practice “may present a most delicate 
question.”62  Yoder further explained that a claim based on solely 
secular considerations is not enough to be protected under the 
Religious Establishment Clauses - it must be rooted in religious 
belief.63  The Supreme Court, in Yoder, helped distinguish a religious 
claim from a secular claim by reference to Henry Thoreau’s rejection 
of the “social values of his time” by isolating himself at Walden 
Pond.64  The Supreme Court noted that if the Amish claimants 
brought their religious challenge because of their “subjective 
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values” like 
Thoreau did, that would fail to constitute a “religious claim.”65  
“Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than 
 
57 Lund, supra note 6, at 1013. 
58 Mohammadi, supra note 56, at 1849. 
59 Id. 
60 Id.; see also Ben Clements, Defining Religion in the First Amendment: A 
Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 536 (1989). The Note proposes 
that: 
[A] constitutional definition of religion should meet three main 
criteria, in addition to the criterion of general compatibility with 
approaches suggested by the Supreme Court. First, it should be 
specific enough to circumscribe the concept of religion, and 
allow courts to distinguish nonreligious from religious beliefs. 
Second, it should be flexible enough to embrace new and 
unorthodox forms of religion. Third, it should be applicable to 
both free exercise clause cases and establishment clause cases.  
Id. 
61 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
62 Id. at 215-16. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 216. 
65 Id. 
11
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religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion 
Clauses.”66   
While courts are “ill equipped” to determine the truth and 
content of a religious belief or practice, courts must analyze a 
claimant’s particular beliefs to determine their actual sincerity to 
avoid flooding the judicial system with frivolous claims.67  Legal 
scholars and commentators commonly understand United States v. 
Ballard68 as the origin of the sincerity doctrine in relation to free 
religious exercise claims.69  Ballard stands for the proposition that 
while courts may never rule on the veracity of a religious claim, the 
sincerity of such alleged beliefs is within the judicial scope.70   
Justice Ginsburg’s comment in the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc.71 dissent noted that courts were judicially incompetent to 
determine the merits of various religious claims and the sincerity of 
such beliefs.72  However, as courts determine the sincerity of person’s 
religious claims, some seek extrinsic evidence to answer religious 
questions.73  This judicial evaluation often relies on the testimony of 
religious experts to confirm that, although not dispositive, the belief 
is idiosyncratic.74  Seemingly contrary to the “hands-off” religious-
question doctrine, courts also use religious text to parallel and 
confirm the purported religious adherent’s beliefs.75 
IV.  JUDICIAL HISTORY 
To demonstrate the unclear Supreme Court doctrine, it is 
useful to review cases and observe how the religious-question 
doctrine confuses the lower courts as they attempt to analyze free 
religious exercise challenges.  In order to determine whether the 
substantial burden element of a RLUIPA claim is met, the courts 
must analyze questions relating to a claimant’s religion.  The circuits 
are split on the issue of whether a de minimis interruption of an 
 
66 Id. 
67 See United States. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) 
68 Id. 
69 Mohammadi, supra note 56, at 1855. 
70 Id. 
71 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
72 Id. at 771 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
73 Mohammadi, supra note 56, at 1864. 
74 Id. at 1867-68. 
75 Id. at 1871. 
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inmate’s religious rights substantially burdens his constitutional 
rights under the First Amendment.76  However, the Supreme Court’s 
religious-question doctrine prevents courts from taking positions on 
religious questions.  Thus, in order to analyze a RLUIPA claim, by 
determining how substantial a religious violation is, the lower courts 
must contradict the overarching Supreme Court rule and put an 
objective value on a governmental violation of an individual’s 
subjective religious belief. 
The Second Circuit in Ford v. McGinnis77 noted that “the 
Circuits apparently are split over whether prisoners must show a 
substantial burden on their religious exercise in order to maintain free 
exercise claims.”78  It is apparent, however, that the courts have 
interpreted the measure of a “substantial burden”79 to be the issue 
that the courts are split on.  For instance, the Second Circuit agrees 
that a de minimis interruption of an inmate’s religious exercise may 
be sufficient to go forward with a religious discrimination claim 
because a more strict and objective test would require courts to 
differentiate “important from unimportant religious beliefs, a task for 
which [it has] already explained courts are particularly ill-suited.”80  
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit concludes that inadvertent and 
isolated mistakes by correctional institutions which impact prisoners’ 
religious rights do not constitute a substantial burden sufficient to 
proceed on a RLUIPA claim.81 
Religious grievance claims relating to dietary 
accommodations within particular religious sects are the most 
prominent of the complaints received from prisoners.82  In Ford, a 
 
76 Mbonyunkiza v. Beasley, 956 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2020) (“As the district 
court noted, there is extensive (but not total) agreement that an isolated, 
intermittent, or otherwise de minimis denial or interruption of an inmate’s 
religiously required diet does not substantially burden his religious belief.”). 
77 352 F.3d 582, 592 (2d Cir. 2003). 
78 Id.  
79 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. 
80 Ford, 352 F.3d at 593. 
81 See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009).   
82 UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 22-24.  The studies of 
the Commission found that some of the most frequently filed group of religious 
grievances are those relating to the dietary practices of religious adherents. Id. at 
22.  Among all of the federal prisons that were investigated combined, 33.6% of all 
religious grievances fell under the category relating to the “delivery/preparation of 
religious diet.”  Id. at 24.  Among all of the federal prisons that were studied, they 
13
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Muslim inmate sued alleging a violation of his First Amendment 
right to free religious exercise when the prison denied his request to 
attend a religious feast.83  Even though the feast was just one meal, it 
was significant because it was an Eid al-Fitr feast, which was 
celebrated only once per year to mark the conclusion of Ramadan.84  
The district court granted the correctional officials’ motion for 
summary judgment because the prison adjourned the celebration meal 
to a date eight days “after the period prescribed by Muslim law and 
tradition”  to accommodate a number of Muslim inmates who 
expressed their desire to hold the event on a weekend to enable their 
families to attend.85   
On the day on which Eid al-Fitr was observed at Downstate 
Correctional Facility (“Downstate”),  Ford was transferred there from 
another institution for a court appearance without notice that the 
traditional feast was postponed to a later date.86  While temporarily 
housed in Downstate’s Special Housing Unit, Ford learned of the 
new date the feast was scheduled, requested that he receive the Eid 
al-Fitr feast on that date, and was subsequently denied permission.87  
Despite the memorandum disbursed to the Muslim Chaplains within 
the Department of Correctional Services noting that Special Housing 
Unit inmates should be included in the “ministerial plans for 
Ramadan and the Ids,” Ford was nevertheless not given permission to 
attend the feast, and was instead incorrectly informed after the 
passing of this date that Special Housing Unit inmates would not 
receive the feast.88  After sending grievance letters to the institution, 
he commenced an action claiming that he was denied his First 
Amendment rights.89  In granting the government defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment, the district court agreed with the defendants’ 
contention that Ford’s religious beliefs were not substantially 
burdened since the feast was rescheduled beyond the three days 
 
accounted for 10.8% of religious grievances relating to complaints regarding 
“access to religious diet.” Id. 
83 Ford, 352 F.3d at 584. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 584-85. 
86 Id. at 584. 
87 Id. at 585. 
88 Id. at 585-86. 
89 Id. at 586. 
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following the end of Ramadan and thus, “no longer carried any 
objective religious significance.”90   
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted the significance of the 
district court doubting Ford’s sincerity in his religious beliefs.91  The 
Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case because the lower 
court improperly held that the plaintiff’s “individualized, subjective” 
religious beliefs were not entitled to protection after having been 
advised of “Islam’s actual requirements” of holding the Eid al-Fitr 
feast within three days close of Ramadan.92  Since it focused solely 
on objective views of another’s religious beliefs, the lower court 
improvidently held that there was an absence of a substantial burden 
because it was a “minor” disruption, and thus, provided a basis to 
grant the prison’s motion as a matter of law. 
In Thompson v. Holm,93 a Muslim inmate sued members of 
the prison staff, alleging that they violated his freedom of religion 
under the First Amendment when the staff refused to allow him to 
properly fast during Ramadan.94  The district court granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Thompson’s 
failure to receive two meal bags for “just two days” was not a 
substantial burden on his free religious exercise rights because he was 
still able to fast, pray, and read the Koran.95  In reversing and 
remanding the case, the Seventh Circuit defined a substantial burden 
as an act conducted by a government employee that “put[s] 
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to 
violate his beliefs.”96  The defendant prison argued that the inmate’s 
 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 588; see Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 
570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002) (“An individual claiming violation of free exercise rights 
need only demonstrate that the beliefs professed are ‘sincerely held’ and in the 
individual’s ‘own scheme of things, religious.” (quoting Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 
F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984))); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-
85 (1965) (“Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs 
because they consider them ‘incomprehensible.’  Their task is to decide whether the 
beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own 
scheme of things, religious.”). 
92 Ford, 352 F.3d at 588. 
93 809 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2016). 
94 Id. at 378. 
95 Id. at 379; see also Thompson v. Holm, No. 13-CV-930, 2015 WL 1478523 
(E.D. Wis. 2015), vacated, 809 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2016). 
96 Thompson, 809 F.3d at 379-80 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. 
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981)). 
15
Sparacino: Violations of Prisoners’ Religious Rights
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021
1688 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
choice between adequate nutrition and a “central tenet” of his 
religion97 was only a de minimis burden of his constitutionally 
protected right and did not rise to a “substantial burden.”98 
Thompson began fasting on August 11, 2010, the first day of 
Ramadan, and the day he began to receive his daily meal bags.99  He 
was provided with the bags every day until a disputed100 interruption 
occurred on August 21.101  After expressing his grievances to the 
correctional employees, he was left with no more meals and had to 
decide whether to continue to not eat at all for the approximate two-
thirds left of the Ramadan fasting or break his fast and go to the 
cafeteria.102  The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the defendant’s 
contention that such a choice to the plaintiff was “simply” a de 
minimis burden, explaining that: 
 
[n]ot only did Thompson receive no proper meal for 
55 hours, leaving him  
weak and tired, he did not know if he would ever be 
put back on the Ramadan 
 
97 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, TECHNICAL REFERENCE 
T5360.01, INMATE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES: ISLAM, Pages 17-18 (2002) 
(“Ramadhan, the ninth month of the Islamic lunar calendar, is the month where 
Muslims begin their period of fasting.  This month is a holy month for Islam 
because during it Muhammad received his initial revelation, made his historic 
Hijrah from Mecca to Medina and the battle of Badr was won . . . . The fast begins 
with dawn and ends with sunset.  Depending on the sighting of the moon, the fast 
may be 29 or 30 days long.  Eating and drinking stops at dawn.  During the day, no 
eating, drinking or sexual activity can take place.  A Muslim must also adhere 
strictly to the moral code, as failure there is considered to be a violation of the 
requirements of fasting.”). 
98 Thompson, 809 F.3d at 379-80. 
99 Id. at 378.  Meal bags were distributed daily during Ramadan at sunset to each 
Muslim prisoner listed as eligible.  Id.  The prison’s chaplain determines eligibility.  
Id.  Each Ramadan meal bag contains two meals: the post-sunset dinner and the 
next morning’s pre-sunrise breakfast.  Id. 
100 Id. at 380 (“Thompson says that shortly before August 21, as he was on his way 
back to his cell, Randall Lashock, a prison guard, handed him a meal bag.  When 
Thompson arrived at his cell, he found that a guard had already left a meal bag for 
him there.  Thompson could not leave his cell to return the extra bag without 
risking a conduct violation, so he left one of the two bags unopened for Lashock to 
retrieve.  Lashock asserts that when he later retrieved that extra meal bag from 
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list and get regular food. This uncertainty put pressure 
on him to resign himself 
to the cafeteria; the anxiety left him unable to practice 
Ramadan properly.103 
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit in Colvin v. Caruso104 
held that an isolated or intermittent denial or interruption of an 
alleged religious practice did not constitute a substantial burden in 
relation to a free religious exercise case.105  Colvin, a Jewish inmate, 
sued after he was transferred to a correctional institution and was 
initially denied kosher-meal status, a position he had pursuant to a 
settlement agreement and court order.106  He brought this challenge, 
among others,107 since the later facility incorrectly believed that he 
was not approved and that he was instead Muslim.108  After the 
plaintiff notified the correctional officials of their error and filed two 
grievances, he was finally placed on the kosher-meal program.109  
Colvin was denied kosher-meal status for sixteen days and despite 
eventually being placed in the program, the prison nevertheless 
incidentally served him non-kosher food on multiple occasions.110 
The district court in Colvin dismissed the claims because “any 
errors in the preparation of Colvin’s kosher meals were inadvertent 
and isolated.”111  The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the decision of the 
lower court, determined that the chaplain unknowingly interfered 
with Colvin’s religious practices and, “at worst, committed a 
‘reasonable mistake’ as to Colvin’s status.”112  The Sixth Circuit 
justified the denial of the kosher meals by reasoning that the chaplain 
looked into the plaintiff’s eligibility to receive kosher meals but 
 
103 Id. 
104 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010). 
105 Id. at 286. 
106 See supra text accompanying notes 7-12. 
107 Id. at 287.  Colvin also alleged that his free religion exercise rights were violated 
by the lack of Jewish services and literature within the prison under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Id.  For the purposes of narrowing my arguments within this 
Note, the Note will be focusing solely on the religious discrimination claims raised 
in the dietary practice nature.  
108 Colvin, 605 F.3d at 286. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 287-88. 
111 Id. at 288. 
112 Id. at 291. 
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determined that he was a Muslim.113  Pursuant to the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons’ Practical Guidelines for Administration of Inmate Beliefs 
and Practices, “Judaism places its distinctive imprint on the most 
ubiquitous practice, the eating experience, in what are known as 
kosher laws.” 114  Thus, it cannot, and according to the Supreme 
Court, should not be disputed that following kosher law may, 
subjectively or objectively, be a means of manifesting some “central 
tenet” of Jewish law and religion.   
The Tenth Circuit in Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone115 held that the 
government’s isolated or intermittent denial or interruption of an 
inmate’s religious rights may not constitute a substantial burden on 
an inmate’s religious exercise.116  In Abdulhaseeb, a Muslim inmate 
filed suit under RLUIPA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, bringing forward 
several complaints in relation to his conditions of incarceration, 
including his unsuccessful attempts to be provided halal foods.117  
The plaintiff claimed he was forced to accept puddings and jello that 
were not halal, as evidenced by the lack of halal symbols on the 
items.118  He was denied an alternative after requesting one because 
he “had not been forced” to accept the foods, and the defendant 
government explained its refusal to accommodate by claiming that 
what he was served did not contain pork or its by-products, “thus 
meeting [his] Islamic beliefs.”119  The plaintiff continuously 
requested accommodations according to his Muslim beliefs with a 
supporting halal diet, and they were consistently denied.120  The court 
held that he failed to present evidence that the vegetarian and pork-
 
113 Id. 
114 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 97, at 50-54. 
115 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010). 
116 Id. at 1321. 
117 Id. at 1306; see Nick Eardley, What is Halal Meat?, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-27324224   (“Halal is Arabic for permissible.  Halal 
food is that which adheres to Islamic law, as defined by the Koran.”). 
118 Id. The plaintiff filed a “grievance concerning being forced to accept puddings 
and jello on his tray.” Id.  He alleged that the defendants represented the food items 
to him as kosher but they failed to contain kosher or halal symbols, so, he claimed, 
they contained forbidden ingredients pursuant to his religion.  Id, The prison 
challenged, claiming he was never forced to place the jello or pudding on his tray 
and that they were pork-free and did not contain pork by-products, “thus meeting 
[his] Islamic beliefs.”  Id. at 1306-07. 
119 Id. at 1306-07. 
120 Id. at 1306. 
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free diets that he was instead offered “forced him to modify or violate 
his religious beliefs.”121   
Abdulhaseeb argued that he sincerely believed that he must 
eat a halal diet that includes halal meats; thus, the vegetarian and 
pork-free alternatives that he was instead offered would not 
suffice.122  The Tenth Circuit, in reviewing the case, determined that 
the plaintiff’s subjective beliefs should be measured to determine 
whether such interference would substantially burden his religious 
exercise rights.123  In the context of RLUIPA claims, the Tenth 
Circuit defined a substantial burden as when a government: 
(1) requires participation in an activity prohibited by a 
sincerely held religious belief, or (2) prevents 
participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held 
religious belief, or (3) places substantial pressure on 
an adherent either not to engage in conduct motivated 
by a sincerely held religious belief or to engage in 
conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief, 
such as where the government presents the plaintiff 
with a Hobson’s choice—an illusory choice where the 
only realistically possible course of action trenches on 
an adherent’s sincerely held religious belief.124 
Though the Tenth Circuit found that there were genuine issues of 
material fact on whether the policy regarding halal foods 
substantially burdened the plaintiff’s rights, the court explained that it 
will not imply that a de minimis interruption of a religious practice 
can constitute a substantial burden.125  The court said: “we do not 
intend to imply that every infringement on a religious exercise will 
constitute a substantial burden.”126  The circuit split is likely due to 
the fact that courts and parties to litigation struggle to define when a 
certain religious accommodation refusal by correctional institutions 
constitutes a “substantial burden” sufficient to maintain a RLUIPA 
claim.127  It is apparent from the overwhelming case law that courts 
 
121 Id. at 1313. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 1315. 
125 Id. at 1316. 
126 Id. 
127 Mbonyunkiza v. Beasley, 956 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2020). Compare 
Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2004) 
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are uncertain on their application of the overarching religious-
question doctrine and they are not provided strict guidance on how to 
measure substantial burdens on a religious right without infringing on 
the Supreme Court doctrine. 
V.  THE NEED FOR CONSISTENCY AMONG THE COURTS 
REGARDING THE ANALYSIS OF FREE RELIGIOUS EXERCISE 
CLAIMS 
As the circuit cases illustrate, ruling on RLUIPA claims in the 
shadow of the religious-question doctrine results in inconsistent 
applications and determinations.  There should be no circuit split on 
this issue because it is not the courts’ responsibility to determine the 
weight or burden of a governmental violation on a specific religious 
adherent’s beliefs.128 
Courts must not restrict religious constitutional rights on the 
basis of an unclear, unsettled doctrine.  Until lower courts are 
provided with some direction on how to define and examine 
substantial burdens on religious rights without answering religious 
questions, they should err on the side of protecting religious freedom.  
To the extent that religious accommodations can be met in 
accordance with compelling state interests, reasonable religious 
accommodation requests should not be restricted in the absence of 
any clear direction in relation to the religious-question doctrine.   
 
 
(defined a substantial burden as when the “government policy or actions: must 
‘significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that manifests some central 
tenet of a [person’s] individual [religious] beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a 
[person’s] ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a [person] 
reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a 
[person’s] religion.”), with Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(defined a substantial burden on religious exercise as “one that forces adherents of 
a religion to refrain from religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains 
conduct or expression that manifests a central tenant of a person’s religious beliefs, 
or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.” This case was 
vacated on other grounds.). 
128 Greenawalt, supra note 43, at 1844. 
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A.  The Importance of The Continuous Consideration 
of Penological Objectives 
To avoid flooding the courts with frivolous claims, it is not 
reasonable for every religious accommodation to be met, especially 
in circumstances where such requests are outweighed by a 
compelling state interest.129  The main objective of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons is to protect the nation’s general population by 
holding offenders inside of prison environments that are safe, secure, 
and abundant with opportunities that “assist offenders in becoming 
law-abiding citizens.”130  In relation to religious accommodations, 
governments are uniformly concerned with extremist activity131 that 
could disrupt the security of its prisons.132  Prisoners have been found 
to be prone to both religious and political radicalization due to factors 
such as “inmates’ relative youth, unemployment, social alienation, 
and their need for self-importance and physical security which is 
often satisfied by the adoption of some group identity.”133  However, 
in order to both protect constitutional religious rights of prisoners and 
to ensure that prison policies are meeting their safety and 
organizational objectives, the government’s security concerns must 
be “grounded on more than mere speculation, exaggerated fears, or 
post-hoc rationalizations.”134 
Most RLUIPA cases that are denied by federal courts are due 
to successful prison safety and security defenses raised by 
correctional institutions.135  For instance, the Eighth Circuit found 
 
129 See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 362 (2015) (the court emphasized the 
government’s compelling interest in the case-namely, in prison safety and security).  
130 About Our Agency, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
https://www.bop.gov/about/agency/agency_pillars.jsp (last visited Nov. 19, 2020). 
131 See UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 32 (During the 
briefing by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, two experts 
demonstrated similar definitions for radicalization-the “process by which inmates 
adopt political or religious extremism, including ‘the willingness to use, support or 
facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.’”) (quoting Prepared 
Statement of Frank Cilluffo, USCCR Feb. 8, 2008 briefing at 3). 
132 Id. (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation has identified prisons as fertile 
breeding grounds for extremist activity.”).  
133 Id. at 33. 
134 Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 939 (2008) (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 
10 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900 (Senate Report on RFRA)). 
135 U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 94 (“As the number of RLUIPA 
cases increased, safety/prison security remained the most common reason cited for 
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that a compelling state interest outweighed the request for a religious 
accommodation in the case of a prisoner claimant challenging the 
prison’s failure to accommodate him with a sweat lodge.136  The 
prison officials did not challenge the sincerity of the religious 
adherent’s request for a sweat lodge nor did they question the notion 
that their denial of the religious accommodation would substantially 
burden the claimant’s beliefs.137  The sweat lodge is undoubtedly 
religiously sacred to the claimant since he claimed his Native 
American beliefs require the use of a sweat lodge to participate in a 
fixed set of songs and prayers.138  The compelling governmental 
interest instead prevailed here and the court afforded due deference to 
the prison officials who were concerned that a sweat lodge would 
pose risks of “sexual misconduct, physical assault, and drug use, as 
well as fire and heat-related safety concerns.”139   
 
denial of prisoners’ requests/complaints each year”); see also Jihad v. Fabian, 680 
F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. Minn. 2010). The plaintiff argued that the defendants 
substantially burdened his religious exercise by preventing him from wearing a 
Kufi, and requiring him to hide his religious medallion under his clothing, which 
precluded him from expressing his Islamic identity. Id. at 1027.  The court there 
found that the plaintiff would likely fail on his religious garment claim since he 
failed to establish a substantial burden on his religious practice.  Id.  The court 
further noted that even if the plaintiff successfully demonstrated a substantial 
burden on the part of the prison, his claim would likely not succeed because it 
would be outweighed by a compelling governmental interest. Id.; Portley-El v. 
Zavaras, 188 F.3d 519 at *2 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that, in Religious 
Establishment Clause cases, the government’s restriction of religious headgear “is 
entirely appropriate” because it poses potential security threats, as such headgear 
“may be used to conceal drugs, weapons, or other contraband, and may spark 
internal violence among prisoners.”). 
136 Fowler, 534 F.3d at 939 (“But no reasonable jurist, affording due deference to 
prison officials, can dispute that serious safety and security concerns arise when 
inmates at a maximum security prison are provided ready access to (1) burning 
embers and hot coals, (2) blunt instruments such as split wood and large scalding 
rocks, (3) sharper objects such as shovels and deer antlers, and (4) an enclosed area 
inaccessible to outside view.”). 
137 Id. at 935. 
138 Id. at 934. 
139 Id. at 935. (“[Defendant] Wood also explained that the sweat lodge would 
‘consume considerable institutional financial and personnel resources’ and ‘expend 
many institutional personnel hours.’ Finally, Wood indicated that extending unique 
privileges such as a sweat lodge to one group of inmates to the exclusion of others 
creates the risk of resentment among the inmate population leading to the potential 
for unrest and disturbance.”). 
22
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To the contrary, other courts have decided that there are 
instances in which it will protect free religious exercise by 
accommodating prisoners.140  In Fegans v. Norris,141 the claimant 
formally notified the detention center he was housed in that he was a 
follower of the Assemblies of Yahweh and began submitting requests 
for a kosher diet.142  The detention center informed him that kosher 
meals were not available and instead placed him on a pork-free 
diet.143  After challenging the prison’s meal policies and exhausting 
his administrative remedies, he brought suit against the prison 
officials.144  The district court found that because the detention center 
did not provide the claimant with kosher meals from December 19, 
2002 until March 3, 2004, the Director of Corrections “knowingly 
violated established law requiring kosher diets.”145   
B. The Powerful Role of Religion in Correctional 
Facilities 
Religion can play an important role in correctional institutions 
and it is critical that the prison systems provide as many 
accommodations as possible.  Prisons may further their penological 
goals by equipping inmates with sufficient religious 
accommodations.  For example, by fostering prisoners’ free religious 
exercise rights, the inmates are motivated by strict discipline and 
order.146  Since there is strong evidence that “spiritual development 
and religious practice promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism in 
inmates,” it is vital that inmates are provided with the means 
necessary to practice their religion, as long as those means can be 
obtained without clashing with any compelling government 
interests.147   
Evidence derived from the study of in-prison religious 
programs has shown that religious accommodations within 
 
140 See generally Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897, 909 (8th Cir. 2008). 
141 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008).  
142 Id. at 900. 
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 901. 
145 Id. 
146 UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 30. 
147 Gaubatz, supra note 22, at 511; see also 139 CONG. REC. S14, 465 (daily ed. 
Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[E]xposure to religion is the best hope 
we have for rehabilitation of a prisoner . . .”). 
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correctional facilities are a valuable asset to society as a whole.148  
Scholars have demonstrated that the role of religion in prison systems 
contributes positively to inmate psychology, emotions, and self-
control.149  Inmates are influenced by the strict principles and 
discipline that surround the practice of their particular religion which, 
in turn, assist them with self-control.150  Another benefit of becoming 
involved with religious groups within correctional institutions is the 
opportunity to meet new peers with similar interests.151  Social 
interaction within religious settings helps foster the acceptance of 
individuals by other inmates within the prison system.152  These 
factors, among many others, have demonstrated that religion plays a 
key role in rehabilitating individual prisoners so that their likelihood 
of maintaining a law-abiding lifestyle increases upon release.153   
C. The Importance of Protecting Religious Minorities 
Religious adherents of non-Christian faiths must have the 
same degree of accommodations as provided to those who observe 
and practice the Christian faith.  A report by the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights found that male inmates of Muslim, 
Jewish, and Native American faiths, acting pro se, filed the largest 
number of RLUIPA claims based on its studies.154  Further, the 
Commission found that both state and federal systems expressed 
hardships in attempting to locate chaplains from minority religions 
such as Islam.155   
Prejudice and the lack of enforcement of equal protection for 
minority religious communities continue to act as a barrier to uniform 
treatment among prisons notwithstanding the alleged elimination of 
language expressly denying religious accommodation to one minority 
 
148 See generally Grant Duwe & Byron R. Johnson, Estimating the Benefits of a 
Faith-Based Correctional Program, INT’L J. OF CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIO. 227-239 
(2013), http://www.baylorisr.org/wp-content/uploads/benefits_faith-
based_correctional_program.pdf. 






154 UNITED STATES COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 102. 
155 Id. at 33. 
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religious group and accommodating other traditional religious 
groups.156  For instance, in the early 1960s, although “the general 
policy of the Department of Corrections [was] to encourage religious 
activities by inmates,” those alleged guidelines were not applied 
across all religious communities, including Muslims.157  As recent as 
sixty years ago, the State Advisory Committee on Institutional 
Religion determined that while those traditional well-known religious 
communities were permitted to pursue their spiritual activities, 
Muslims were not afforded this same type of freedom.158  In In re 
Ferguson,159 the Muslim petitioners alleged that: 
 they [were] not allowed a place to worship, that their 
religious meetings [were] broken up, often by force, 
that they [were] not allowed to discuss their religious 
doctrines, that they [were] not allowed to possess an 
adequate amount of religious literature, and that their 
religious leaders [were] not allowed to visit them in 
prison.160 
There were three instances in which one of the Muslim petitioners 
requested a copy of “the Muslim Bible,” the Koran, and was denied 
such accommodation.161  Petitioner Ferguson’s Muslim religious 
scrapbook was in the possession of another Muslim inmate when it 
was confiscated by prison officials and destroyed since it was 
considered contraband.162  The correctional officer, in his incident 
report relating to the scrapbook, stated that “this book consisted of 
the usual ‘Muslim’ trash, advocating hatred of the white race, 
superiority of the black man ,….”163  The California Supreme Court 
ultimately denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by nine 
inmates, noting that the correctional staff reasonably denied religious 
 
156 Sarah E. Vallely, Criminals Are All the Same: Why Courts Need to Hold Prison 
Officials Accountable for Religious Discrimination Under the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 191, 196 (2007). 
157 In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 667 (1961) 
158 Id. 
159 55 Cal. 2d 663 (1961). 
160 Id. at 670. 
161 Id. at 668. 
162 Id.  
163 Id. 
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freedom given the safety and security concerns with Muslim 
prisoners.164   
Data collection has shown that the percentage of prisoners 
eighteen years of age and older who associate themselves with 
minority religious groups tends to be larger in comparison to the 
proportion of those faiths among non-incarcerated individuals in the 
United States eighteen years of age and older.165  It is necessary that 
correctional employees are provided with sufficient training on the 
various religions and their practices to ensure equality among the 
differing beliefs within the prison systems.166  By providing prisoners 
with reasonable religious accommodations to the fullest extent 
possible, it is likely that those individuals will succeed more 
efficiently in their rehabilitation efforts, thereby reducing the 
recidivism rates so that prisons can instead spend their budgets on 
religious accommodations rather than housing repeat offenders.  An 
individual’s religious beliefs are sacred and beneficial; thus, 
governments must provide reasonable accommodations when 
requested and justifiable.   
Chaplains play a crucial role in the encouragement of religion 
in correctional facilities.167  These individuals generally “provide 
pastoral care and counseling to all inmates, regardless of the inmate’s 
faith.”168  Prisons are not mandated to employ chaplains representing 
every religious association within the correctional institution.169  
However, in 2007, the Federal Bureau of Prisons employed 251 
chaplains.170  Among that total number of chaplains, unsurprisingly, 
“73.9% were Protestant, 17.4% were Catholic, 0.8% were Orthodox 
 
164 Id. at 671-74. 
165 U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 39. 
166 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 97 (“This 
Technical Reference Manual (TRM) on Practical Guidelines for Administration of 
Inmate Beliefs and Practices has been written to assist chaplains and administrative 
personnel to appropriately facilitate the religious beliefs and practices of inmates 
within a correctional environment.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. FED. BUREAU OF 
PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT P5360.09 (Dec. 31, 2004) (provides detailed 
religious policies pursuant to 28 CFR § 548.10 to those institutions under the 
Bureau of Prisons). 
167 U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 16. 
168 Id.  
169 Mary Ellen West, Religious Practices and Materials, 30 ILL. L. & PRAC. 
PRISONS § 29. 
170 U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 21, at 16. 
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Christian, and the remaining 7.9% were from non-Christian religions-
Buddhism (0.4%), Judaism (2.1%), and Islam (5.4%).”171   
To offset the imbalance among the chaplains representing the 
well-known religious groups in comparison to the minority religions, 
the Bureau of Prisons often rely heavily on contracts with outside 
religious leaders to perform as clergy for the underrepresented 
groups.172  These religious contractors and volunteers help meet the 
“religious and spiritual needs of federal inmates professing non-
Christian faiths or membership in smaller Christian 
denominations.”173  Unfortunately, however, some federal prisons, 
notwithstanding their best efforts, have expressed an overall 
challenge in employing chaplains, volunteers, and contractors of non-
Christian faiths, particularly Islam.174  In the absence of clear 
direction from higher courts in analyzing a prisoner’s RLUIPA claim, 
it is crucial that governments work to allocate more resources to 
assist prisoners associated with minority religions to obtain access to 
religious resources just as the other prisoners are afforded such 
opportunities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The supreme law of the land provides that freedom of religion 
does not terminate upon the imposition of an incarceration 
sentence.175  Since religious beliefs and practices tend to help guide 
spiritual adherents through their daily lives, it is necessary that the 
government offers as many justifiable accommodations as possible in 
the absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court.  While the 
religious-question doctrine’s purpose to keep courts from putting 
objective values on subjective and personal beliefs is important, the 
Court’s approach is difficult to apply in principle.  In ruling that 




173 Id.  
174 Id. at 16-17. 
175 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Greenhill v. Clarke, 944 F.3d 243, 250 (4th 
Cir. 2019) (“Access to bona fide religious exercise is not a privilege to be dangled 
as an incentive to improve inmate conduct, and placing such religious exercise in 
the category of privilege to be earned is fundamentally inconsistent with the right 
to religious exercise that RLUIPA guarantees to prisoners.”). 
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with the interpretation of religious practices and beliefs,176 the 
practical reality is that lower courts must engage in religious 
interpretation when ruling on religious exercise claims.  Thus, the 
courts should err on the side of prisoners’ religious freedoms by 
protecting these rights. 
Lower courts, in the absence of a clear doctrine, have clearly 
become willing to engage in their own determination of the 
importance of a particular individual’s religious beliefs and practices, 
as evidenced by the circuit split regarding the measure of de minimis 
violations of a prisoner’s religious rights.  If courts were to apply the 
religious-question doctrine strictly, the term “de minimis” should 
never be used in relation to the alleged burden that the prison officials 
impose on prisoners since the burden is personal in nature.  While 
other scholars have proposed narrow recommendations to help 
facilitate a clearer application of the religious-question doctrine,177 it 
is clear that it would be in the best interests of all to refrain from 
restricting prisoners’ justifiable religious requests until the Supreme 
Court clarifies the religious-question doctrine.  Constitutional rights 
of religious exercise must continue to be reasonably accommodated 
in prison settings until the Supreme Court provides clear direction on 
how the lower courts should analyze religious questions.  Therefore, I 
propose that de minimis should no longer be used to qualify the 
 
176 Levine, supra note 52, at 85. 
177 Mohammadi, supra note 56, at 1877-78 (“I am interested in trying to reorient 
the sincerity analysis to better capture the type of inquiry that judges are actually 
making when they delve into religious questions to screen accommodation claims.  
I propose a different understanding of the sincerity inquiry, that of sincerity as 
plausibility, which helps make sense of courts’ apparent disregard for the religious-
question doctrine.  This reorientation of the sincerity inquiry captures the current 
behavior of judges, describing in better terms than pure “sincerity” what judges are 
evaluating when they screen religious-accommodation claims.”); Garnett, supra 
note 55, at 862 (“Given this goal, Professor Smith was right, I believe, to suggest 
more than twenty years ago that the First Amendment’s no-establishment provision 
has a ‘two-fold’ ‘essential task,’ namely ‘to prevent government from interfering in 
the internal affairs of religious institutions and, conversely, to prohibit religious 
institutions from directly exercising governmental authority.’ The hands-off rule, 
then, should be constructed and applied consistent with this task and, correctly 
understood, it seems to me that the rule serves the task well.”); Greenawalt, supra 
note 43, at 1904 (“The Supreme Court should require some form of neutral 
principles approach, one that allows courts to consider a broad range of documents 
and also settled principles and practices of church authority that bear clearly on 
matters of governance and control of property.”). 
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strength of a subjective prisoner’s religious beliefs and courts should 
err on the side of such prisoners to protect their constitutional rights. 
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